Security Of India’s Offshore Assets

Security Of India’s Offshore Assets

Challenges and Opportunities

By

Cmde Sanjay Tewari, retd, Business Head, CISB Technologies Pvt Ltd

(Article Written For A&S INDIA)

India’s land border on the western front is well demarcated, illuminated and fenced, where feasible. In contrast, the maritime border is neither visible, being only a line marked on navigational charts while another line 200 nautical miles seawards, demarcates India’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) where India has exclusive rights to oil and gas exploration, drilling, mining for rare minerals, fishing and any other form of economic activity.

The EEZ covers a sea area of roughly 2.7 million sq km, which, in perspective is nearly three fourths of India’s land area. Within the EEZ various companies, both state owned and private have been awarded blocks for the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons. These areas are collectively known as the Offshore Development Area (ODA).

In the Western ODA, the farthest field lies 160 Km into the Arabian Sea. There are 13 process complexes, 214 well platforms and 25 – 30 rigs or drill ships. In terms of economic investment, ONGC alone has pumped in close to $ 27 billion. The offshore fields currently produce 25% of India’s demand for crude. On the east coast, the offshore produces 75% of India's demand for natural gas. Clearly, the offshore is a vital area from the point of monetary investment and maintaining India’s energy security.

The threats to the Offshore are numerous and ever changing – apart from the possibility of infiltration and sabotage from inimical elements, and physical occupation of platforms, which are obvious, a vigil also needs to be maintained against hijacking of vessels, deliberate collision by ships against platforms, vandalism and damage to unmanned platforms, damage to pipelines at land-fall points and attack by hostile craft, among others. This requires that all ships and boats operating around platforms be observed closely.

In order to better monitor movement of ships and boats, a number of networked radars are installed on offshore oil platforms to provide a composite maritime picture of the entire ODA to the navy. This surveillance is backed up by armed patrol boats maintaining a physical presence in the area. The sea area of the ODA has been placed off limits to shipping, with general ship traffic being re-routed around the ODA. Vessels entering the ODA for legitimate purposes are required to obtain permission from the GOI before they are permitted to enter. This includes a physical verification of the vessel and crew by the Navy.

Vessels displacing more than 300 tons are required to have Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders installed, that provide essential ship identification information when interrogated. Thus at any time, the Navy is aware of the credentials of all ships inside the ODA. Ships that do not fulfill the security criteria, or are observed to be straying from their designated courses are visited by the prowling patrol boats. Backing up the patrols are Naval and Coast Guard aircraft and ships. While entry and movement of ships has been effectively controlled and monitored, security imperatives are complicated by the presence of numerous fishermen in their small boats.

During the fishing season, there are literally hundreds of boats, none of which have AIS transponders. Although a zone of 500m around the oil platforms and rigs has been designated as a no fishing zone, fishermen have been found fishing in the immediate vicinity of platforms, since fish are attracted by the lights of the platform and the gas flare at night. Many of these fishermen have no I Cards. While the GoI has embarked upon an ambitious program to issue Smart Cards to all sea going fishermen, only about 20 lakhs have been issued cards, which still leaves a number nearly four times larger waiting for Smart cards. Similarly smart card readers are also required in large numbers, with each patrol boat requiring at least one reader.

Vandalism by fishermen at night on unmanned platforms is a perpetual problem as they tie up their boats quietly and use the platform for cooking and sleeping and in the process help themselves to copper or other valuable materials. While it is feasible to install movement detectors and cameras, the information cannot be sent in real time as it is done on land. While on land it is feasible to use GPRS to transfer information in real time, SIM cards do not work beyond a few km out to sea. Similarly, the manned platforms need measures to warn them of approaching fishing boats since it is not possible for patrol boats to be everywhere.