SECURING THE OFFSHORE

SECURING THE OFFSHORE

India’s land border on the western front is not only clearly demarcated and fenced, but is also sufficiently illuminated for it to be visible from an international flight overhead. In contrast, the maritime border is neither visible nor discernible in the endless, ever moving ocean, being only a line marked on navigational charts. The ocean, scornful of such inane matters as boundaries, continues far beyond the twelve mile line that marks the limit of the sovereign Republic of India, while on the charts another discreet line 200 nautical miles seawards, demarcates an area of tremendous value to India. It is in this immense sea area that India has exclusive rights to oil and gas exploration, drilling, mining for rare minerals, fishing and any other form of economic activity.

The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) abuts the entire coast of India, over a sea area of roughly 2.7 million sq km, which, in perspective is nearly three fourths of India’s land area. Within the EEZ various companies, both state owned and private have been awarded blocks for the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons. There are 10 such areas, collectively known as the Offshore Development Area (ODA) are also known by their operative names, perhaps the most well known being Mumbai (formerly Bombay) High.

Exploitation of the ODA commenced in the early seventies after the discovery of the Bombay High oil field. Initially ONGC was the only player in the offshore exploration sector, but since the late eighties, private firms have also joined the fray. In the Western ODA, the farthest field lies 160 Km into the Arabian Sea. There are 13 process complexes, 214 well platforms and 25 – 30 rigs or drill ships. In terms of economic investment, ONGC alone has pumped in as much as $ 24 billion and is all set to invest a further $ 1.7 billion by 2012. The offshore fields currently produce 25% of India’s demand for crude. On the east coast, the offshore produces 75% of India's demand for natural gas. Clearly, the offshore is a vital area from the point of monetary investment and maintaining India’s energy security.

Although the ODA falls within the beat precinct of the Coast Guard, security has in fact been entrusted to the Navy. Towards this, an organization was raised in 1983 with the specific aim of facilitating security of the western ODA. The Offshore Defence Advisory Group (ODAG) is headed by a Rear Admiral, who is also the advisor to the Government of India (GOI) on offshore security.

The threats to the Offshore are numerous and ever changing – apart from the possibility of infiltration and sabotage from inimical elements, and physical occupation of platforms, which are obvious, a vigil also needs to be maintained against hijacking of vessels, deliberate collision by ships against platforms, damage to pipelines at land-fall points and attack by hostile craft, among others. This requires that all ships and boats operating around platforms be observed closely.

In order to better monitor movement of ships and boats, a number of radars were installed on offshore oil platforms. Since 2006, these radars have been networked to provide a composite maritime picture of the entire ODA, which enabled single point naval surveillance of offshore areas. This surveillance is backed up by armed patrol boats maintaining a physical presence in the area. The sea area of the ODA has been placed off limits to shipping, with general ship traffic being re-routed around the ODA. Vessels entering the ODA for legitimate purposes are required to obtain permission from the GOI before they are permitted to enter. This includes a physical verification of the vessel and crew by the Navy.

Vessels displacing more than 300 tons are required to have Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders installed, that provide essential ship identification information when interrogated. Thus at any time, the Navy is aware of the credentials of all ships inside the ODA. Ships that do not fulfill the security criteria, or are observed to be straying from their designated courses are visited by the prowling patrol boats. Backing up the patrols are Naval and Coast Guard aircraft and ships that regularly sweep these areas. While the entry and movement of ships has been effectively controlled and monitored, the security imperatives are complicated by the presence of numerous fishermen in their small boats.

During the fishing season, there are literally hundreds of boats, none of which have AIS transponders. Although a zone of 500m around the oil platforms and rigs has been designated as a no fishing zone, fishermen have been found fishing in the immediate vicinity of platforms, since fish are known to be attracted by the lights from the platform and the gas flare at night. In such cases, identity papers of the offending fishermen are confiscated and handed over to the Yellow Gate Police for further action. However, with many fishermen having neither the knowledge nor understanding of rules and regulations, keeping them away from the immediate vicinity of platforms becomes an uphill task. The patrols are also required to check the identity papers and antecedents of fishermen, lest some undesirable elements try to sneak in under the garb of Indian fishermen.

Given the fact that the ODAs cover an area of 9000 sq km, and that it takes a single boat nearly six hours to cover an area of radius 10nm (17km), it is evident that the patrolling effort is enormous and clearly needs to be backed by technology. Boats being used at present are commercial craft and trawlers unequal to the size and scale of the task. While there are also proposals to issue RFIDs to all fishermen, however at present  of the 15,59,640 coastal fishermen identified in India, only about 50% even have identity cards. The Home Ministry has also proposed that not only should all fishing boats be registered, but their movements in and out of port must be regulated. They should also have AIS transponders and communication equipment to facilitate tracking and monitoring. Further, the Navy has been advocating for an extension of the no-fishing zone around offshore platforms since the present  distance of 500m provides very little response time. However there is a long way to go in all these areas.

The Navy has also been observing with concern the trend of pirates to shift eastwards and has accordingly been preparing for newer and hitherto unforeseen emergencies. In order to maintain the edge of its personnel tasked with emergency response, fast attack craft, helicopters and commandos are regularly drilled to react within the shortest available time. In addition, the Navy is awaiting a number of Immediate Support Vessels, which would be more effective for security duties at sea. However despite these measures, the risks remain, for the ocean is a vast and lonely place which does not brook man-made boundaries and artificial barriers, thereby imposing a level of vulnerability to any offshore asset, which must be guarded by men at sea. On the other hand, the resources available to patrol will always be restricted in numbers by their availability and ability to cover a given area, which in turn depends upon factors like endurance, weather, sea-keeping ability in various sea states, maintenance and repair support, manpower etc. It is no mean task to patrol the seas day after day, in small open boats, with few creature comforts, ignoring the sea-sickness induced by the constant motion and the searing heat of a bright sun reflected off the sea surface. But it is this ceaseless dedicated effort at maintaining constant vigil, while disregarding discomfort, by the men in white, from all corners of India, that has ensured security of the offshore and will do so in future.

Towards A Secure Coast

TOWARDS A SECURE COAST

By

Kris Tee

Events of the last three years have demonstrated the porous nature of India’s maritime borders and the difficulties in sealing a 7500 km long coastline. In 1993, RDX was landed on a quiet stretch of Maharashtra’s Raigad coast, while in 2008, terrorists were emboldened enough to sail right into the heart of Mumbai. Unfortunately, maritime security has been ignored for too long on account of sea blindness of our national planners, with their focus on land borders. However maritime security which encompasses coastal security among other domains, remains an integral part of national security. Coastal security refers to safeguarding the sea zone upto 12nm from the shore, including ports and other infrastructure.

In order to understand the structure of India’s coastal security apparatus and why some lapses are inevitable, the developments in this area may be viewed in two periods, the first being 1993 to 26/11 and the second, post 26/11 till the present.

After the 1993 Mumbai blasts, when it emerged that the explosives used had reached India via the sea route, the implications were not completely understood, for that was the era of smuggling of attractive electronic items, perfumes, scotch whisky and other objects of desire. The smuggler who was invariably portrayed in a number of Bollywood films of that era was regarded as anything but a security threat.

Initially, a plan of patrolling the coasts of Gujarat – Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu was formulated, but this had little success as it was largely left to the Indian Navy (IN) and Coast Guard (CG) without serious participation by the states. It was only post Kargil as late as 2005, that a Coastal Security Scheme was prepared for strengthening the infrastructure for patrolling and surveillance by coastal states. Among other things, setting up of a Marine Police along with 73 coastal police stations and procurement of 204 interceptor boats was recommended. However things moved at a lackadaisical pace. In Jan 07, a proposal for an enhanced Maritime Security Framework (MSF) was submitted by the IN, which envisaged setting up a Maritime Security Advisory Board under the National Security Advisor. However this proposal too has not materialized.

Things changed rapidly after events of the following year. For one, 26/11 exposed the sheer scale of asymmetric warfare being waged upon us from over the sea and our complete vulnerability and unpreparedness to counter it. Secondly, it highlighted the need to pay attention to this vital area of national security. For the first time, the nation woke up to the existence of sea borders. It also brought into focus the difficulties faced by the primary maritime enforcement agencies, the IN and CG, given the multiplicity of agencies with interests in the marine domain, the lack of a single overseeing authority, and the ambiguity as a result of ineffective legislation and overlapping jurisdictions.

A number of wide ranging decisions were taken and the process of ensuring proper maritime security was initiated, some of which are –

·      The IN was designated as the agency with overall responsibility for maritime security

·      Joint Operating Centres were to be set up at Mumbai, Vizag, Kochi and Port Blair

·      A 1000 strong Sagar Prahari Bal with fast interceptor boats was to be raised by the Navy

·      The Coast Guard was designated as the agency responsible for security in territorial waters

·      A Coastal Radar Chain and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) was to be set up covering the entire coast

·      AIS transponders were to be installed on all vessels below 300 tons

Besides the above, states were advised to expedite setting up of all 73 coastal  police stations, 97 check-posts and 58 outposts. The number of stations was increased to 96, to be raised to 131 subsequently. Of these, 48 stations and some check-posts and outposts have been constructed although how many are actually functioning is not clear. This police infrastructure is important as on India’s 7500 km long coastline, there are 13 major ports and nearly 200 minor ones. In Maharashtra alone, there are 60000 fishing boats and checking each one of them at sea is impossible. Since these boats cannot land just anywhere, but at a port or designated beaches, it is much easier to regulate the boats at land-fall points. Recall that on 26/11, the Pakistani infiltrators had entered through the fishing village at Cuffe Parade, challenged by no one except an old woman who was brushed aside. Had they been confronted by uniformed policemen, the story may well have been different.

Setting up the coastal radar chain and the AIS chain are the next two pieces of the watery jigsaw puzzle. AIS transponders are mandatory equipment for all vessels over 300 tons and these provide essential ship identification information automatically when interrogated. A chain of such stations along the coast thus provides maritime agencies, instant information on the identity and whereabouts of ships in their coverage areas. Backing up the AIS chain would be a network of radars along the coast that would provide the locations of all vessels at sea including those not covered by AIS. Linking up local radar and AIS stations to a regional hub, helps in effectively monitoring such traffic. Although these are yet to be realized, once in place, it would help the CG and the Marine Police to maintain effective surveillance over their beat areas, since it is neither feasible nor economical to have boats positioned everywhere.

The IN, in the interim took the initiative to develop the concept of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in consultation with all stakeholders including coastal states and UTs. Simply put, MDA is awareness of all that goes on at sea and on the coast. The MDA plan essentially involves integrating the information gathered by patrolling and surveillance assets, including the coastal radar and AIS chains, as well as, the data gathered through registration of vessels and their crew and placing them via an electronic backbone on a common platform that can be shared by all stakeholders.

The Department of Shipping is working towards registration of all fishing and non-fishing vessels, installation of communication sets and AIS transponders on all types of vessels, especially those below 300 tons. However given the large numbers of boats and the general aversion to any form of regulation, this task is bound to take long. The Department of Fisheries is also working simultaneously towards issuing biometric I-cards to all 15,59,640 coastal fishermen. Similarly, another initiative is aimed at providing coastal area I-cards to people living in coastal areas.

Regulating the movement of fishing boats is another important and long pending requirement. At present, these boats move freely in and out of port and knowledge of boat movements is essential to detect suspicious activities. To accomplish this, State Maritime Boards are required, which unfortunately exist in only three of the twelve coastal states. Other than Gujarat, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu the others are yet to comply with instructions to set up Maritime Boards. Perhaps if this system had been in place earlier, the prolonged absence of the fishing vessel Kuber and its crew could have rung a few alarm bells.

As would be evident, a great deal of work has been put in and more has been initiated, although it cannot be denied that the general pace of work has been slow. But there are also cases where lack of professional debate and foresight has led to hasty, ill thought out purchases, whereby equipment has been rendered non-operational and unusable very early. Most importantly, a maritime orientation has yet to set in among agencies. Marine Police units are yet to be formed in some states while in other places personnel have shown reluctance to go to sea being unprepared and unused to the constant motion of boats.

Undoubtedly, security of a 7500 km long coastline, ignored for decades cannot be realized overnight, nor can attendant problems be wished away. It needs to be clearly realized that coastal states have to take maritime security seriously and is not the exclusive domain of the Navy and Coast Guard and that all stakeholders must play their part to make our coasts safe. 

Traditions Of The Sea

Neptune’s Kingdom

By Cadet xxx, NDA

With Inputs From

Kris Tee

The kingdom of Neptune – an enormous region covering three quarters of the earth’s surface and sheltering millions of mysterious subjects has had a long association with man. Indeed all life emerged from the sea. Since time immemorial, man has turned to the sea for food, livelihood, raw materials, adventure, a medium of transport and perhaps on a lower footing a place to fight and dominate his fellow man. Generation after generation has sailed out to sea and created strange customs with whispered legends, that later became firm beliefs and traditions.

Most of the undying legends of the sea were created in the days of the sail. While there were ships of various types, perhaps the most famous were the clippers. These were great square rigged sailing ships that could sail at a ‘clip’, hence their name, and were built mainly of wood and iron. There were the great Blackwall Frigates for carrying passengers and immigrants, fast clippers like the incomparable Cutty Sark (now a national memorial in UK) for the China tea trade, clippers for carrying grain, coal and miners to the gold fields, like the legendary American Down Easters.

To sail these mighty ships, a mighty breed of man was required, who could stay aloft for hours at a stretch, grappling with flogging canvas that could whip him away to an untimely death. The Captains belonged to a class entirely their own. They could not rely on their official authority alone to maintain discipline, but had to be able to quell mutiny by sheer force of personality or even batter a hard case into submission. Often the Second Mates were chosen for their fighting rather than sailing abilities. It was an unwritten law in those savage days that if a sailor could best the Second Mate in a fight, he automatically took the worsted officer’s place – but it did not happen often.

In those days a sailor’s life was a very minor thing. A swinging boom could easily sweep a sailor into the sea or a cleverly contrived motion of the ship could lead to a fatal fall from the yards. In the event of any inquiry, all that the Captain had to say was that it had been too rough to lower boats, which usually closed the matter. Some ships acquired the reputation of ‘Hell Ships’ or ‘Blood Boats’. It was not surprising that particularly in the UK, sailing was not a popular way of life and men had to be forced to join. Recruitment was from the dregs of society and more often than not, was done through ‘press gangs’ and ‘waterside crooks’ who did not hesitate to use force against unsuspecting persons to fill the decks of ships with ‘hands’ as sailors are still known. The expression, ‘to shanghai’ has its origins in those days as one of the most infamous leaders of press gangs was Shanghai Brown.

Theft aboard the ship, whether it was of stores, food or belongings was one of the most heinous offences. The penalty ranged from being made to stand on deck with the stolen object around the neck, to hanging from the yards. For blaspheming and swearing, on offender was forced to hold a marlinspike in his mouth, “… until his tong be bloodie!”, while those habituated to uttering dirty words had their tongues scraped with sand and canvas, a treatment that usually left the victim speechless for several days. If a ship was becalmed due to the absence of sufficient wind, it meant that the god of wind needed to be placated – by caning all the ship’s boys.

Keel hauling was another terrible punishment. The offender was lashed in a bowline and hauled from one end of the mainyard to the other by way of the keel. If the offender did not die from drowning, he almost certainly did from loss of blood as the barnacles on the hull tore his skin to shreds and left him bleeding profusely. The punishment for mutiny was usually death and there was an elaborate procedure followed for hanging. On the given day, the hanging ship would hoist a yellow flag, which was a signal for other ships to send their men to witness the execution. This task was generally reserved for troublemakers and potential mutineers. As soon as they were aboard, they would be mustered aft with the rest of the ship’s crew with the bos’un piping, “All hands to witness punishment”. After the priest had done his bit for redemption of the doomed soul, a cannon would be fired and a team of men would haul away at the rope by walking away from the yard, while marines with fixed bayonets faced the crew. A man who had witnessed a hanging, seldom failed to get the message. The last such punishment was carried out on board HMS Leven on 13^th July 1860.

Once upon a time the quarter-deck was a place where a crucifix was hung and sailors passing that way would doff their caps and bow. That was the forerunner of the present custom of saluting the quarterdeck. Another typically naval institution, the beard, had its origins during the reign of an English monarch, who on a whim decided that his sea captains looked too soldierly with their fierce whiskers and needed to distinguish themselves. He decreed that thenceforth they must either grow beards or remain clean-shaven. Similarly, bell bottomed trousers had their origins in the Royal Navy as it was found easier to roll up trouser legs, while cleaning the deck, when the width of the trouser bottom was increased slightly. There had to be seven folds, with each fold representing one of the seven seas.

Ships have long been identified by their captains, with the ship assuming a seniority based on her captain’s position in the pecking order. Accordingly, the tradition of salutes at sea goes back a long way with gun salutes pre-dating the hand salute. It was customary for the saluting ship to turn and head towards the ship being saluted, since on sailing ships guns were mounted on the sides and by heading towards another ship, it could not be mistaken for an act of aggression. Today, however with guns being mounted fore and aft, the act is reversed with the saluting ship sailing past her senior. Before stop watches were invented, the interval between successive gun salutes was maintained to 5 seconds by the repetition of the couplet, “If I wasn’t a gunner I wouldn’t be here. Number two (or three ..) gun, fire!”

Courtesies at sea are important particularly when two ships pass each other. Merchant ships passing men of war either in harbor or at sea dip their ensigns as an act of courtesy and recognition, while the warship acknowledges it also by dipping her own ensign.

The custom of piping the side, an honour accorded to certain visiting dignitaries, has its origins when Captains used to visit other ships at sea. The visiting captain would be hoisted aboard from his boat in a chair slung from one of the yards to the accompaniment of the bos’un giving instructions to his crew with his pipe.

Manning and cheering ship in the old days was done as a mark of respect to another person or ship with the decks, yards and shrouds being manned. In India this is an honour reserved for the President, the Chief of Naval Staff and other Flag Officers at sea, as well as, on the final departure of a foreign ship on her way home, and, on the entry into port of a ship that has taken part in a victorious battle.

Since in India we consider the breaking of a coconut to be auspicious before commencing a new task, the coconut is broken on the bows of a ship by a lady when that ship is launched. However in the western Navies, it is a bottle of wine that is broken on the bows by the lady. On one occasion, the bottle slipped and injured a spectator who promptly sued the British Admiralty. It was therefore decreed that thereafter the bottle would be secured by a lanyard. The origin of this custom can be traced to a time when it was customary to drink a toast in a silver goblet to wish that ship prosperity and safety. Thereafter the silver goblet would be cast into the sea to prevent a toast of ill health being drunk from the same glass. Since the practice began to prove rather costly, it was decided instead to break a bottle of wine on the bows.

The Parsi shipbuilders of Surat and Bombay also had their own custom known as the Silver Nail Ceremony, which was observed when the keel of a new ship was laid. A silver nail, about seven inches long, with the name of the ship and the date, inscribed on one of its sides would be ceremonially driven in to join the keel and bow, to the accompaniment of incantations by a Parsi priest. On the west coast of India, traditional shipbuilders to this day observe the custom of implanting a tiny silver statue of Lord Ganesha within the keel of a new ship being built.

On 20^th December 2011, when the President of India reviews her Fleet, it would be the continuation of yet another ancient tradition where the Admiral along with his captains paid homage to their sovereign. By that act, the Supreme Commander would ensure that traditions would continue to be observed, in the realm of Neptune or Varuna, by all those who sail His domain. In this fast changing world that we live in, it is a reminder that despite the changes brought about by man on land, the sea from where all life emerged remains eternal and unchanging.

- The author wrote this article 30 years ago as a cadet in the NDA.

MARITIME PIRACY – THE ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

The word pirate has this misleading habit of conjuring up illusions of a colorful character perhaps even a lovable rogue with a salty tongue and a jaunty air. The International Maritime Board (IMB), however dryly defines piracy as the act of boarding any vessel with intent to commit theft or any other crime and intent to use force for the same.

Although piracy on the high seas has been around for centuries, it reduced drastically during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries due to increased patrolling by naval ships, introduction of legislative measures and better administration of islands and ports.

The resurgence of piracy in the late 20^th century coincides with a worldwide reduction in naval fleets along with a corresponding increase in mercantile shipping. Naval ships are expensive to maintain and operate and require support bases located in the general area of interest, with a continuous military presence, all of which became politically and economically unviable in the post-colonial world. The reasons for the emergence of insurgent groups are the same all over the world. Exit of colonial powers from underdeveloped countries, leaving behind a poor political and administrative system ill equipped to compete on a global level, the entry of vested interests and the emergence of power factions armed with weapons funded by multinational corporations seeking to exploit natural resources leading to civil strife and a breakdown of law and order.

Somalia’s is a classic case where sea-pirates run virtually unchecked in the absence of any form of governmental control. Civil war has raged for twenty years and the federal government controls only a small part of territory around the capital while the coastal regions remain autonomous. Already poor and war torn, the region suffers from repeated droughts. Tagged as a failed state, the fact remains that Somalia has the longest coastline in Africa and sits at a strategic position dominating the entry into the Indian Ocean from the Gulf of Aden. The absence of a Somali navy or Coast Guard has reportedly been exploited by European firms to dump toxic wastes, effectively killing off the livelihood of local fishermen. Elsewhere, foreign fishing vessels have illegally harvested the locals’ fishing grounds. Initially grouped together to fight off illegal foreign trawlers, the fishermen, who included former soldiers, soon found an easier catch, the large numbers of slow moving, unguarded merchant vessels carrying high value cargo and passing fairly near their coast. Justifying their attacks as retribution for illegal dumping and stolen fish, they also soon discovered that ship owners were more than willing to pay for the release of their crew and cargo and that piracy was far more lucrative than fishing.

According to the Piracy Reporting Centre of the IMB, out of 346 attacks reported worldwide, 194 have occurred near Somalia. As on date there are 15 vessels and 277 hostages held by pirates awaiting payment of ransom.

Although naval forces from various countries have been deployed off the Horn of Africa (HOA), for the last three years, their presence has had only partial success. There is no doubt that naval ships have been successful in disrupting pirate attacks and have escorted many merchant ships to safety. Naval Special Forces deployed in the area have successfully rescued crew members from pirates, capturing a number of pirates in the process, who have been sent to jails in the captors’ countries. However their success in extracting ransom payments for captured ships has ensured that pirate gangs are never short of recruits. That the pirates have begun to see themselves in a patriotic mould is evident from names like National Volunteer Coast Guard and Somali Patriotic Movement adopted by pirate gangs.

Arming of merchant ships and other defensive measures like travelling in convoys has been debated at length, however the discussion has been complicated by the fact that a large number of ships fly flags of convenience to circumvent the regulations of the owner’s country and any political consensus on security is usually defeated, though it is reported that recently some such flag states have agreed on certain measures. The fact that even large merchant ships are sparsely manned and are unable to maintain continuous all round vigil, has further emboldened pirates to attack with impunity.

Owners of ships carrying inflammable or dangerous cargo have been understandably reluctant to allow armed guards on board due to the inherent risks involved with gunfire. There is also the issue of the effectiveness of one or two guards armed with rifles pitted against a number of pirates in speedboats armed with heavier weapons like rocket launchers that can punch a hole in a ship’s side. Arming of merchant ships always runs the risk of pirates raising the levels of violence which merchant ships will not be able to match. Further, there are legal issues involved in carrying automatic and military pattern weapons in the territorial waters of nations that do not permit them.

Recent incidents of piracy have shown that Somali pirates are moving farther afield, away from their home coast right up to the Lakshadweep Islands. This could be an indication of the pressure applied by increased naval patrolling off the HOA, or could be increased boldness on their part. Either way, these actions spell trouble for India since interrogation of captured pirates has indicated a tie-up between the Somali Al Shabab militia and the LeT. There is also evidence that pirates have links with the Al Qaida. India’s stakes in the Offshore Development Areas in the Indian Ocean are extremely high and we can ill afford to let down our guard.

If we attempt to do the math, we shall see that the numbers keep piling up. Piracy has pushed up the cost of insurance premium for cargo transiting piracy prone areas. Merchant ships are forced to hire extra crew members to do lookout duty in their hitherto ignored stern sectors. Some have been forced to hire armed private security guards. Increased naval patrolling has driven up the operating costs of navies who have also been compelled to acquire additional craft to replace those now almost permanently engaged in anti-piracy patrols. And still, all this is not enough.

The oceans of the world are simply too vast, the assets requiring protection far too many and widely dispersed, while the resources available at the disposal of governments are simply too few. Then there are the complex legal issues involved with providing security, for instance, for a ship that flies a flag of one nation, has an owner from another, carries a cargo exported by a third nation, bound for yet another country and manned by a crew that could be a mix of various nationalities. There is also the issue of disposal of captured pirates. The question of what is to be done with suspected pirates who may be observed at sea, but not actually engaged in acts of piracy, begs answering.

Although Somalia has reportedly permitted navies of some countries, including India, to enter their territorial waters in pursuit of pirates, most countries shy away from taking direct action within another country’s jurisdiction for fear of collateral casualties and thereafter getting involved in lawsuits and that country’s issues. Most countries would rather avoid the hostile tag that would almost certainly be applied to them, following their killing of another country’s citizens on their soil, in the course of what would probably be short term gains, since it opens up their own civilians to reprisal attacks.

The similarity between piracy off the Horn of Africa and the Naxal problem in India is startling. Both are the result of economic exploitation of the peasantry. Police action in both cases has not been effective. Both groups see themselves in a righteous, ideological light and both have the potential for linking up with terrorist groups. Importantly, both prey on transport vehicles plying highways, albeit of different kinds. The solutions in one case may therefore also provide lessons for the other.

In an increasingly commercially driven world, where the thirst for energy products has forced countries to depend on ships plying extended supply routes, nations are forced to regard the demands of pirates as mere operating costs. Therefore while to some, piracy may appear to warrant military action, other countries lacking military wherewithal may simply work out a monetary arrangement. A lasting solution is however far more complex and lies somewhere between naval patrols, punitive legislative action, economic aid, enforcing respect for the territorial integrity and rights of a nation unable to do so and political and administrative strengthening of one of the most impoverished and dangerous nations on earth. This is easier said than done as the United Nations would have to display consensus and unity in action to a degree higher than seen lately. Till then there is no option but to continue with naval patrols over vast stretches of ocean.