Towards A Secure Coast

TOWARDS A SECURE COAST

By

Kris Tee

Events of the last three years have demonstrated the porous nature of India’s maritime borders and the difficulties in sealing a 7500 km long coastline. In 1993, RDX was landed on a quiet stretch of Maharashtra’s Raigad coast, while in 2008, terrorists were emboldened enough to sail right into the heart of Mumbai. Unfortunately, maritime security has been ignored for too long on account of sea blindness of our national planners, with their focus on land borders. However maritime security which encompasses coastal security among other domains, remains an integral part of national security. Coastal security refers to safeguarding the sea zone upto 12nm from the shore, including ports and other infrastructure.

In order to understand the structure of India’s coastal security apparatus and why some lapses are inevitable, the developments in this area may be viewed in two periods, the first being 1993 to 26/11 and the second, post 26/11 till the present.

After the 1993 Mumbai blasts, when it emerged that the explosives used had reached India via the sea route, the implications were not completely understood, for that was the era of smuggling of attractive electronic items, perfumes, scotch whisky and other objects of desire. The smuggler who was invariably portrayed in a number of Bollywood films of that era was regarded as anything but a security threat.

Initially, a plan of patrolling the coasts of Gujarat – Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu was formulated, but this had little success as it was largely left to the Indian Navy (IN) and Coast Guard (CG) without serious participation by the states. It was only post Kargil as late as 2005, that a Coastal Security Scheme was prepared for strengthening the infrastructure for patrolling and surveillance by coastal states. Among other things, setting up of a Marine Police along with 73 coastal police stations and procurement of 204 interceptor boats was recommended. However things moved at a lackadaisical pace. In Jan 07, a proposal for an enhanced Maritime Security Framework (MSF) was submitted by the IN, which envisaged setting up a Maritime Security Advisory Board under the National Security Advisor. However this proposal too has not materialized.

Things changed rapidly after events of the following year. For one, 26/11 exposed the sheer scale of asymmetric warfare being waged upon us from over the sea and our complete vulnerability and unpreparedness to counter it. Secondly, it highlighted the need to pay attention to this vital area of national security. For the first time, the nation woke up to the existence of sea borders. It also brought into focus the difficulties faced by the primary maritime enforcement agencies, the IN and CG, given the multiplicity of agencies with interests in the marine domain, the lack of a single overseeing authority, and the ambiguity as a result of ineffective legislation and overlapping jurisdictions.

A number of wide ranging decisions were taken and the process of ensuring proper maritime security was initiated, some of which are –

·      The IN was designated as the agency with overall responsibility for maritime security

·      Joint Operating Centres were to be set up at Mumbai, Vizag, Kochi and Port Blair

·      A 1000 strong Sagar Prahari Bal with fast interceptor boats was to be raised by the Navy

·      The Coast Guard was designated as the agency responsible for security in territorial waters

·      A Coastal Radar Chain and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) was to be set up covering the entire coast

·      AIS transponders were to be installed on all vessels below 300 tons

Besides the above, states were advised to expedite setting up of all 73 coastal  police stations, 97 check-posts and 58 outposts. The number of stations was increased to 96, to be raised to 131 subsequently. Of these, 48 stations and some check-posts and outposts have been constructed although how many are actually functioning is not clear. This police infrastructure is important as on India’s 7500 km long coastline, there are 13 major ports and nearly 200 minor ones. In Maharashtra alone, there are 60000 fishing boats and checking each one of them at sea is impossible. Since these boats cannot land just anywhere, but at a port or designated beaches, it is much easier to regulate the boats at land-fall points. Recall that on 26/11, the Pakistani infiltrators had entered through the fishing village at Cuffe Parade, challenged by no one except an old woman who was brushed aside. Had they been confronted by uniformed policemen, the story may well have been different.

Setting up the coastal radar chain and the AIS chain are the next two pieces of the watery jigsaw puzzle. AIS transponders are mandatory equipment for all vessels over 300 tons and these provide essential ship identification information automatically when interrogated. A chain of such stations along the coast thus provides maritime agencies, instant information on the identity and whereabouts of ships in their coverage areas. Backing up the AIS chain would be a network of radars along the coast that would provide the locations of all vessels at sea including those not covered by AIS. Linking up local radar and AIS stations to a regional hub, helps in effectively monitoring such traffic. Although these are yet to be realized, once in place, it would help the CG and the Marine Police to maintain effective surveillance over their beat areas, since it is neither feasible nor economical to have boats positioned everywhere.

The IN, in the interim took the initiative to develop the concept of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in consultation with all stakeholders including coastal states and UTs. Simply put, MDA is awareness of all that goes on at sea and on the coast. The MDA plan essentially involves integrating the information gathered by patrolling and surveillance assets, including the coastal radar and AIS chains, as well as, the data gathered through registration of vessels and their crew and placing them via an electronic backbone on a common platform that can be shared by all stakeholders.

The Department of Shipping is working towards registration of all fishing and non-fishing vessels, installation of communication sets and AIS transponders on all types of vessels, especially those below 300 tons. However given the large numbers of boats and the general aversion to any form of regulation, this task is bound to take long. The Department of Fisheries is also working simultaneously towards issuing biometric I-cards to all 15,59,640 coastal fishermen. Similarly, another initiative is aimed at providing coastal area I-cards to people living in coastal areas.

Regulating the movement of fishing boats is another important and long pending requirement. At present, these boats move freely in and out of port and knowledge of boat movements is essential to detect suspicious activities. To accomplish this, State Maritime Boards are required, which unfortunately exist in only three of the twelve coastal states. Other than Gujarat, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu the others are yet to comply with instructions to set up Maritime Boards. Perhaps if this system had been in place earlier, the prolonged absence of the fishing vessel Kuber and its crew could have rung a few alarm bells.

As would be evident, a great deal of work has been put in and more has been initiated, although it cannot be denied that the general pace of work has been slow. But there are also cases where lack of professional debate and foresight has led to hasty, ill thought out purchases, whereby equipment has been rendered non-operational and unusable very early. Most importantly, a maritime orientation has yet to set in among agencies. Marine Police units are yet to be formed in some states while in other places personnel have shown reluctance to go to sea being unprepared and unused to the constant motion of boats.

Undoubtedly, security of a 7500 km long coastline, ignored for decades cannot be realized overnight, nor can attendant problems be wished away. It needs to be clearly realized that coastal states have to take maritime security seriously and is not the exclusive domain of the Navy and Coast Guard and that all stakeholders must play their part to make our coasts safe.