Making Our Cities Safe From Terror

Although this article is written from the point of view of Mumbai, it equally applies to every other city in India.

In the aftermath of 13/7, as did happen after 26/11 and all the other dates that have since assumed their place in India’s Hall of Infamy, a lot of fur flew, soul searching was done, candle light vigils and solidarity meetings were held, high powered committees were formed and various TV anchors and prominent citizens held forth during stirring debates, after which everyone went home to bed with that warm feeling of having done their bit for the general good of society. The enthusiasm lasted about a month. In the present instance, I can already see it wearing off in less than two weeks.

The fact is, candle light marches achieve nothing other than imbibing the marcher with a pleasant feeling. We have already heard the Home Minister and his counterpart from the opposition say on national TV that there was no intelligence failure – possibly the weakest excuse that has been trotted out in recent times. Obviously, when there is no intelligence there can be no failure. India’s recent history is replete with knee jerk reactions, yet we seem to ignore the basics time and again. As a race we don’t have a sense of history and the saying, “those who don’t learn from the lessons of history are doomed to repeat its failures” becomes a self fulfilling prophecy in India’s case.

After 26/11, the call went out to have a commando force to guard the city of Mumbai, never mind the fact that the NSG had already been asked to set up a base in Mumbai. Mumbai’s outspoken elites wanted to do their bit for their less fortunate minions. In less than a year an ‘elite’ commando force was created. It remains a mystery how a regular constable can be transformed into a commando and thereafter an ‘elite commando’ in less than a year, without taking part in actual operations, without feeling the need to creep up on hostiles in their own territory in complete silence and the dozens of other situations that a commando has to face. A commando’s USP is his motivation. How does he remain motivated when his own officer doesn’t go through the grind with him?

Force One was created to guard the city like a fort, though that is hardly the job of a commando, the cop at the local police station with intimate knowledge of the by-lanes is better suited for guarding the city. The fact that Mumbai’s police chief didn’t want them around during President Obama’s visit spoke volumes for his confidence in his men. Unfortunately, the setting up of this force is the latest in a series of symbolic cosmetic gestures designed to deflect attention from the fundamental issues that need far greater attention.

Thus far, all our responses have been calibrated on the assumption that the next terrorist strike on the city would again be on the lines of 26/11. However terrorists are not known to be predictable. The blasts of 13/7 proved the fruitlessness of setting up an additional commando force, of buying armoured cars and amphibious equipment of doubtful efficacy when what was required was sound policing and intelligence. After every bomb blast, the only visible indication of any response from the law machinery are the barricades that spring up on roads serving little else other than choking traffic. The locations of barricades and the modus operandi of the police are so predictable that any terrorist who has done his due diligence would have long factored in the same into his plans.

Ineffective and half baked measures are inevitable when the sound advice of seasoned and experienced policemen is drowned by the shrill voices of socialites, actors, poets, financial geniuses and others allowed to influence policies where specialist knowledge is required. According to Prakash Singh, a former DG of the BSF, DGP of Assam and UP and a security analyst, the role of the local police station and the beat constable has been steadily sidelined. The Beat Constable was infact the ‘boots on ground’ of the law and it was his responsibility to walk around physically sighting everything and every person in his assigned area. A good beat cop kept watch on the criminal elements in his area and reported their activities and movements to his superiors. This enabled the local police station to build up its data base and it always had its finger on the pulse of its localities. They cultivated their own network of informers who provided information on activities not normally visible to uniformed policemen. This view is echoed by Ajai Sahni, the Director of the Institute for Conflict Management and a counter terrorism expert.

According to Sahni, the crucial imperative of improving general police capabilities has largely been ignored and the police constable remains what he was – poorly trained, poorly motivated, distanced from the intelligence chain, operating in conditions of stress and held in complete contempt by the general public and his own masters. Prakash Singh suggests steps to improve basic policing – the police station must be adequately staffed, men should be well trained, well equipped with reliable weapons, transports and communication facilities. Similarly the morale and well being of the policeman cannot be ignored – housing in particular, being a major stress factor in a large and expensive city, has to be provided. Lastly, though perhaps easier said than done, the police has to be freed from extraneous pressures.

One cannot make a city safe from terrorists while ignoring local criminal gangs and anti-social elements, for it can be safely concluded that terrorists will seek local assistance for information gathering, planning, logistic support and possibly for the actual operations also. Josy Joseph, writing for the Times of India has explored the possibility of the whole operation being outsourced by ideological groups, to those whose only motivation is money. He states that there are indications that the whole business is being outsourced to local criminal gangs or individuals who would carry out the recce, identify the spot and plant the bomb. He points out that it would be a clear advantage to the ISI, if locals could be recruited to conduct the strikes so that evidence would point investigators in the direction of Indians and nothing could be traced back to Pakistan. He also points out that outsourcing would be done to groups with proven capability and in fact the only difference between Mumbai and Delhi is the presence of a number of underworld gangs in Mumbai.

After 26/11, the government appointed a committee under former Union Home secretary, Ram Pradhan to look into the security lapses and recommend steps to avoid recurrence. Some of the recommendations of the Pradhan committee that are yet to be implemented are:
• Set up a nodal officer to coordinate between central and state intelligence agencies.
• Ensure closer liaison between the police and telecom companies
• Make the private sector responsible for their own security
• Draft SOPs for tackling terror attacks in future

All the above are seemingly self explanatory and may appear to be stating the obvious, however they have deep implications. While there are a number of central and state intelligence agencies in the urban hubs of Delhi and Mumbai, few of them talk to one another to share information, lest the glory be carried off by someone regarded as a rival agency. Hence a person carrying out a schoolmaster’s function is required to get each to share their zealously guarded information. This is a result of myriad agencies being created over the years. Whether the nodal officer will be able to convince the concerned agencies to share information, is anybody’s guess. According to Ajay Sahni, while terrorists may target Delhi and Mumbai, planning and training operations are usually conducted in the badlands of some poorly governed state or even abroad. Hence it is essential that not only should the intelligence networks be buzzing proactively, but the police should be monitoring telephone calls to and from the Maoist affected areas through the active cooperation of mobile service providers.

In my earlier article I had pointed out the difficulty of emergency and quick response services rapidly reaching the site of a terrorist attack or a building where a terrorist may be holed up, given the congestion in areas favoured by terrorists. There is virtually no alternative to decongest areas considered most vulnerable. Private corporations, business district associations and other collectives have to initiate their own security measures as recommended by the Pradhan Committee, for which removal of hawkers and vendors to specific zones and vehicles from the immediate frontage of shops to parking areas is an essential pre-requisite. Access to areas has to be controlled by private security persons who need to be trained to do more than merely donning a uniform. Once trained to observe crowds, monitor CCTVs, and identify signs of suspicious behavior, the private security can function as the extended eyes and ears of the police, informing them of criminal activity.

By and large, the laws are in place, what remains is their enforcement. We live in an era when nonchalantly flouting laws has become the norm, not only among the semi-educated but also among the educated upper middle class. Yesterday, driving on the sea-link I was surprised to see a couple of cars parked on it with people enjoying the breeze and view – this less than two weeks after 13/11, when there are signs saying that stopping on the sea link is forbidden. Obviously, when there is no one to catch them, people increasingly wink at the law. It is absolutely imperative that the police pull up their socks in all areas and ensure observance of the law in letter and spirit to send out a message not only to the public but also to criminal gangs and through them, to terrorist outfits. Only when the pressure of effective policing is felt by local criminal elements that terrorists will find it difficult to plan and operate with impunity as they are doing at present.

Do bear in mind that post 9/11, it is hardcore policing, intelligence and internal security measures that have kept USA safe, not the Predator drone strikes in Afghanistan or for that matter any military action halfway around the earth.

At present the city is barely under control of the law, and it is time to reclaim it. To do that, the answer is not to put up more police barricades, but instead to let the general public know that the police means business in all spheres, be it crowd control, vehicle traffic regulation, scrutiny of antecedents of foreigners and people seeking accommodation both in housing societies and in the city’s hotels and hostels, monitoring of phone chatter to and from suspicious areas and every other form of basic ground level policing. The answer lies in using technology to aid manual methods and employing smart, impartial and fair methods of laying down the law, thereby drawing the population closer rather than alienating them.

We must realize that we are now at war and though we may not see the enemy, the enemy sees us. It is a war without the drama and overt action, but with all the blood and gore of a regular war, spilled on our streets, where the next battle casualty could be your school going daughter. It is a war where brute force is ineffective and where the mind must be used efficiently. In the words of Gen Patton, “No b**** ever won a war by dying for his country, he won by making the other poor dumb b**** die for his country.” It’s time to wake up and get smart.