Security Of India’s Offshore Assets
Challenges and
Opportunities
By
Cmde Sanjay Tewari,
retd, Business Head, CISB Technologies Pvt Ltd
(Article Written For A&S INDIA)
India’s land border on the western
front is well demarcated, illuminated and fenced, where feasible. In contrast,
the maritime border is neither visible, being only a line marked on
navigational charts while another line 200 nautical miles seawards, demarcates
India’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) where India has exclusive rights to oil
and gas exploration, drilling, mining for rare minerals, fishing and any other
form of economic activity.
The EEZ covers a sea area
of roughly 2.7 million sq km, which, in perspective is nearly three fourths of
India’s land area. Within the EEZ various companies, both state owned and
private have been awarded blocks for the exploration and exploitation of
hydrocarbons. These areas are collectively known as the Offshore Development
Area (ODA).
In the Western ODA, the
farthest field lies 160 Km into the Arabian Sea. There are 13 process complexes,
214 well platforms and 25 – 30 rigs or drill ships. In terms of economic
investment, ONGC alone has pumped in close to $ 27 billion. The offshore fields
currently produce 25% of India’s demand for crude. On the east coast, the
offshore produces 75% of India's demand for natural gas. Clearly, the offshore
is a vital area from the point of monetary investment and maintaining India’s
energy security.
The threats to the
Offshore are numerous and ever changing – apart from the possibility of
infiltration and sabotage from inimical elements, and physical occupation of
platforms, which are obvious, a vigil also needs to be maintained against
hijacking of vessels, deliberate collision by ships against platforms, vandalism
and damage to unmanned platforms, damage to pipelines at land-fall points and
attack by hostile craft, among others. This requires that all ships and boats
operating around platforms be observed closely.
In order to better monitor
movement of ships and boats, a number of networked radars are installed on
offshore oil platforms to provide a composite maritime picture of the entire
ODA to the navy. This surveillance is backed up by armed patrol boats
maintaining a physical presence in the area. The sea area of the ODA has been
placed off limits to shipping, with general ship traffic being re-routed around
the ODA. Vessels entering the ODA for legitimate purposes are required to
obtain permission from the GOI before they are permitted to enter. This
includes a physical verification of the vessel and crew by the Navy.
Vessels displacing more
than 300 tons are required to have Automatic Identification System (AIS)
transponders installed, that provide essential ship identification information
when interrogated. Thus at any time, the Navy is aware of the credentials of
all ships inside the ODA. Ships that do not fulfill the security criteria, or
are observed to be straying from their designated courses are visited by the
prowling patrol boats. Backing up the patrols are Naval and Coast Guard
aircraft and ships. While entry and movement of ships has been effectively
controlled and monitored, security imperatives are complicated by the presence
of numerous fishermen in their small boats.
During the fishing season, there
are literally hundreds of boats, none of which have AIS transponders. Although
a zone of 500m around the oil platforms and rigs has been designated as a no
fishing zone, fishermen have been found fishing in the immediate vicinity of
platforms, since fish are attracted by the lights of the platform and the gas
flare at night. Many of these fishermen have no I Cards. While the GoI has
embarked upon an ambitious program to issue Smart Cards to all sea going
fishermen, only about 20 lakhs have been issued cards, which still leaves a
number nearly four times larger waiting for Smart cards. Similarly smart card
readers are also required in large numbers, with each patrol boat requiring at
least one reader.
Vandalism by fishermen at night on
unmanned platforms is a perpetual problem as they tie up their boats quietly
and use the platform for cooking and sleeping and in the process help
themselves to copper or other valuable materials. While it is feasible to
install movement detectors and cameras, the information cannot be sent in real
time as it is done on land. While on land it is feasible to use GPRS to
transfer information in real time, SIM cards do not work beyond a few km out to
sea. Similarly, the manned platforms need measures to warn them of approaching
fishing boats since it is not possible for patrol boats to be everywhere.
